

Powered by Emotion -
The 'Spångberg-Variations' on technology
by Petra Sabisch

Mini-chronology of variations

In 1725, Anna Magdalena Bach copied an aria without title in Book II of her "*Clavierbüchlein for Anna Magdalena Bach*".

In 1741, Johann Sebastian Bach published a composition, entitled as

*Clavierübung consisting of an Aria with Diverse
Variations for the Harpsichord with Two Manuals
Composed for Music Lovers to Refresh their Spirits.*¹

This piece (BWV 988) was later known as the *Goldberg Variations*. It opens with an Aria, that is said to be a copy of Anna Magdalena's *Clavierbüchlein*.

In 1955, Glenn Gould recorded his piano-interpretation of the *Goldberg Variations* at the age of 23 years in 38'40", mono. Twenty-seven years later, in 1982, he realized another piano-recording of another interpretation of the *Goldberg Variations* in 51'14", stereo.

On the 24th of January 1975, Keith Jarrett improvised the *Köln Concert* within 61'19".

In 1992, Steve Paxton danced an improvisation on the *Goldberg Variations*. For Variations 1 to 15 he used the 1982 recording, for Variations 16 to 30 he used the 1955 recording of Glenn Gould.²

Only four years later in 1996, the musicians Compay Segundo, Eliades Ochoa, Ibrahim Ferrer, Ry Cooder and Ruben Gonzalez recorded the *Buena Vista Social Club* at Egrem Studios, Havana in Cuba.

In August 2003, Mårten Spångberg realized the performance *Powered by Emotion*, which later on wrote history under the title:

*A corporeal exercise of interpreting with diverse variations for
body, voice and a black Coca-Cola T-Shirt,
composed for dance, performance and other lovers to refresh
their spirits.*

For this interpretation, commonly abbreviated as *Spångberg Variations*, he uses the recorded improvisations of Steve Paxton (a film by Walter Verdin), the *Köln Concert* by Keith Jarrett, the *Goldberg Variations* by Glenn Gould and the instrumental arrangements of the *Buena Vista Social Club* recording, made by Robert Gober and Jürgen Reichartz.

More precisely: Spångberg dances his interpretation of the reconstruction of Steve Paxton's improvisations of the *Goldberg Variations* and interprets a karaoke version of an instrumental recording of the *Buena Vista Social Club*. His piece is a choreographic interpretation of the reconstruction of a dance improvisation and the vocal interpretation of a recording of a musical interpretation.

Yes. That's what it is.

And nothing else, except several blacks and the black T-Shirt he wears, the one with the white logo of a wide-spread and insane American elixir.

Emotions

Nothing else?

Apparently this question still arises in contemporary choreography and performance.

There is a performer who proposes his danced interpretation of another improvisation of another variation, as well as he sings by himself the Cubane-Spanish lyrics with an English-Swedish accent, read from the little CD-booklet.

There is an audience, which perceives what it perceives, reproducing or fighting against that wish for emotion, that might be disengaged by the recognition of a music, said to be emotional.

And there are some critics, who are – outraged. They seem to be insulted by Spångberg's body as a such, displeasing to their eyes especially in tallness and posture, they are offended by a general lack of technique and dance skills and an insufficient showiness of interpreting capacities such as virtuosity. Reclaimed are emotions, which do not only seem to be missing, but whose calculated withdrawal makes it worse: this is too cerebral a show to

be understood by certainly well-intentioned critics, who even go to the artist's talk to compensate their incomprehensiveness.³

Astonishingly enough, these critiques still witness the fact, that they absolutely got what they claimed for. Or how else could this phenomenon of being upset to a passionately insulting degree be qualified, if it is not "powered by emotion"?

Nothing else, but powered by emotion?

Emotions II

According to Brian Massumi, who follows Gilles Deleuze's reading of Spinoza in this point, an emotion

*"is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity owned and recognized."*⁴

Massumi emphasizes the necessity of differentiating between emotion and affect: Whereas an emotion refers to the already known and experienced, an affect is by definition "unqualified. As such it is not ownable or recognizable".⁵ This differentiation (I have to leave beside, in how far it is one of quality or of degree) seems to be a useful tool within the small analytical tool box we have in order to deal with the perception of contemporary performances. Yet, it should not be misunderstood as the difference between 'bad emotions' and 'progressive affects', since the problem is rather to know, how intensities and 'sensations' canalize into emotions or affects. What is it that steers perception to openness rather than to closure? And are we at all able to steer, decide or influence our sensations?

Dilettantism

Following this question, I realized that one aspect traversed the whole range of emotional complaints: This aspect is called dilettantism.

According to the etymological online dictionary, the term *dilettante* comes from Latin and signifies a "lover of music or painting", which is derived from "dilettare" (latin: delectare), "to delight". First witnessed for 1733, (accordingly Anna Magdalena's copy could not be meant) it designates originally a "devoted amateur" without negative connotation. The pejorative sense emerged only later by contrast with "professional".⁶ Briefly, when dealing here with Spångberg's *Powered by Emotion*, we have to do with a lover, whose love might defy the professions of choreography, performing arts or criticism. But in which sense?

First of all, it is striking that the spectre of dilettantism has accompanied nearly all of the fore-

mentioned artists: According to Yo Tomita, Bach's compositional styles in 1737-1738 were attacked by the composer and musical critic Johann Adolph Scheibe (1708-76), who further denounced him for a lack of general academic knowledge and of "the 'true basis of music and its real beauty'".⁷ Glenn Gould was first supposed to be too ambitious, when he recorded the extremely difficult *Goldberg Variations* at the age of 23 and then criticized for playing them in a "dry" and unromantic style. And Keith Jarrett has been considered a dilettante, for he dared to play Bach as the Jazzman he was...⁸

Unless we backlash to romantic representations of the artist as a frequently mistaken or misconceived genius, - and Spångberg's piece is not at all placed in this kind of perspective – the question is rather: What is it, that makes of artistic practices a mini-chronology of dilettantes? In what way does Johann's, Glenn's, Keith's and Mårten's love for a specific practice converge? And what enables a practice to challenge the profession it belongs to? Or how can we conceive of professions, if they are put into question by the very practices that constitute them? And in which manner are devotion and love related to these practices, that meanwhile have become historical dates?

A little trip to the notion of technique

In order to approach these questions concerning dilettantism, practice and love, I would like to suggest a reading of the *Spångberg Variations* as profound critique of what is considered a *technique* in the Performing and Choreographing Arts. Some general remarks on the conception of 'technê' seem therefore necessary, for they help situate the piece on the larger scale of the actual discussions about the relationship between theory and practice, experimental and educational modes and the realms of research and its visibility.⁹

The Greek word 'technê', which precedes the separation of art from other practices, is generally translated as craft, art or practice, in opposition to the Greek word 'epistêmê', which designates knowledge or theory. Yet, the contemporary distinction between practice and theory appears in ancient Greek philosophy rather as a complex relation. From Xenophon to Plato and Aristotle, from the Stoics to Alexander of Aphrodisias, the knowledge of how to do things has been more or less intranscendently connected to the craft and skills of exercising or producing. In the very example of medicine as the 'physician's' skill to procure health, the intersection between conceptions of health, strategic practices to cure diseases and experienced accounts on these strategies becomes evident: theoretical and practical (which is here different from empiric), knowing and making are necessarily intertwined, whether or not the healthy body is considered as product of a specific technique or as the healing method itself without product. According to the excellent article of Richard Parry, that I am here referring to, the separation of knowledge and technique and the hierarchization that

makes of knowledge a virtue superior to technique, is only installed with Plotinus.¹⁰

Now, a several features of these ancient discussions are still relevant for the present context. First of all, a 'technê' comprehends either a *specific function* of the craft either *the activity of the craft itself*. Even if the objective of a technique is sometimes distinguished from the activity of the technique itself, and even if there may be differences between craftsmen's skill and medical knowledge for example, *epistêmê* and *technê* are closely tied to each other, if not interchangeable. *A technique encompasses a specific functionality, its knowledge, processing and its product.*

Second, both craft and knowledge as means to know how to accomplish specific objectives, are related to an understanding of these objectives. In this perspective, *technique signifies not only to know how to proceed methods in order to reach objectives, but to link the methods to the various interpretations of the objectives of the real real. As interpretation and understanding, a technique questions which objective for which real real.*

According to Parry, these linkages between craft, skill, method and knowledge draw furthermore on the exercise of political rule, especially in Plato. *A technique is thereby dismantled as reliable on strategic values, such as the advantageous ruling of the polis, and thus, embedded in power relations.*

Fourth, Aristotle distinguishes between a knowledge of things, that admit to change and a knowledge of things, that do not change. The latter one, referring to invariable principles, is called *epistêmê* or scientific knowledge, whereas the first one appears as *technê* or technical knowledge, which is capable of dealing with contingencies, accidents and other vivid variations. However, both knowledges belong to the domain of the *epistêmê*, as they are transferable in teaching. Simple experience, on the contrary, is not considered as knowledge, at least as long as it cannot be taught, which means that one does not grasp its causality. Important for our contemporary concerns is here on the one hand, the notion of change which belongs to a practical rather than to a theoretical thinking. And on the other hand, it is interesting, that the very 'proof' of knowledge is the possibility of its transmission. *A technique thus appears as virtuous knowledge about the variables of life, which is transferable and part of a politics for a better citizenship.*

The Stoics stress fifth the aspect, that reason is connected to "impulsive feelings", as it controls sensorial impulses. But distinct from ordinary logocentric models, reason is here the "craftsman of impulse", for "it moulds impulse through knowledge of the good". Ultimately, a technique reveals the manner and the degree in which reason is connected to sensation. These modes of connection depend on what is perceived as appropriate. *The adequacy of a technique is not a skill that can be acquired by mere reason, but depends on modes of perception, which means aesthetical sensations.*

The sixth and last aspect of technê is the discussion about failure. Distinct from failure as error (as the false execution of a technique), Alexander of Aphrodisias introduces the *stochastic failure*, which means that although everything possible has been done to achieve a task, the result relies on chance or circumstances (as in healing for example). This aspect clarifies, *that a technique might consist of variables, which are not entirely to be governed.*

The Spångberg Variations on technology ¹¹

I want to return now to my assumption, that the *Spångberg Variations* function as critique of the contemporary conception of technique, which opposes technique to knowledge and theory. Surprisingly and paradoxically, this reductive conception often comes along with the supposedly certainty of knowing which technique would be appropriate for the performing or choreographing professions. Yet, how is Spångberg's critique unfolded? How does one make a technique appear on a stage? Or what is finally varied in the Variations?

Powered by Emotions starts with a performer who listens more or less casually to Keith Jarrett's beginning of the *Köln Concert* before his body starts resonating to the music. After approximately three minutes, a black makes him invisible and yet, the continuation of his seemingly intimate dance becomes even more present. Some seconds later, the music is suddenly interrupted and the performer stays in a silent dark, until the first sounds of the Glenn Gould version become audible. While by then continuing his dance in the fade-in of the light, several figures of Steve Paxton's improvisation are recognizable. Yet, rendered is not the exact copy of every movement of Paxton, but the reconstruction of an improvisation. A strangely ambivalent choreography, that, - although written - performs a permanent shifting somewhere inbetween the reconstruction of moving forms, the reproduction of possible 'impulses' for these forms and the choreography of attitudes, which allude to improvisational practice. From the first moments on, it is evident that *Powered by Emotion* is too less an exercise in exactitude, as it is too less an exercise in 'laxitude'; it is too less displaying a performer who is powered by emotion, as it is too less displaying a performer who is not powered by emotion. Performed is somebody who is skilled but not enough to thrill the audience by spectacular or innovative dance figures, somebody who reproduces a choreography, but not enough to let the "original" appear or the "originality" of his "own" interpretation; somebody who withdraws the will to persuade an audience, but not enough to erase the doubt, that this withdrawal is calculated...

In other words: The piece maintains a thorough tension between the display of a variation and its permanent withdrawal from becoming the new prototype of variation. The reference to Paxton's, Bach's, Gould's and Jarrett's variations does neither become the 'copy' of a 'genuine modell', nor does it stay mere quotation, reconstruction or re-enactment. Spångberg

never dances Paxton's style and he never plays being the new singer of the Buena Vista Social Club. All that he does while dancing and singing, is to take an accurate care for this tension, which never tumbles into one of the two sides of being more or less than a variation. *But within this tension, every single variation unfolds as the repetition of a differential between the present variation and another variation, maybe a historical, maybe a future one.* Now, precisely because Spångberg does *nothing else* than to use the forementioned improvisations and interpretations, his piece raises the issue of *how the material is used and for what use. And this is Spångberg's question concerning technology; a whole bouquet of questions:*

What are the objectives for choreographic practices, if they do not aim at installing new prototypes? What kind of results or products do we need? How can we escape from steadily reproducing the separation between the process and the product? What are the specific functions of choreographic and performative arts? In how far does the use of a material from a time-span of 250 years vary our understanding of methods? If dancing, singing and reproducing combines craft, cognition and method, how do we link this potential to our interpretations of the real real? How is the theatrical frame entangled with the real real? And if 'usage' as practice *and* knowledge is reliable on strategies, what are the actual strategies of the arts? What is their relationship to power, especially in times of affective power? In what sense is choreography/ performance dealing with change, variables and contingencies? How are performative practices linked to our formation as political citizens? And what are the aesthetical choices which escape to mere reason, but might emerge via perceptions and sensations? At which moment, does a technique fail? What are actually the ungovernable aspects of a technique?

The *Spångberg Variations* offer some answers to these general and actual questions: Using a material of variations, Spångberg dares to refuse the conception of absolute newness which still haunts the arts. Yet, precisely because of the difference that he produces by *nearly* repeating and *nearly* reconstructing, there is something *nearly* new in this show, at least for me. One aspect is for example the movement quality in the dancing part, which contrasts the idea of perfection as form-fulfillment, accomplishment in exactitude or display of skilled excellence without errors. If instead perfection is conceived as struggle for an appropriate relationship between working method, knowledge and craft, Spångberg's piece could definitely apply for prizes. Despite his commitment to an intimate and heterogeneous dance, he always retains the "fully achievement" of things like authenticity, spontaneity, performativity... The question what this retention is for thereby appears as part of his dance, not as an externalizable issue. Yet, he does not answer *except by performing variations* and he resists the seduction to replace his question by given forms, aesthetics and techniques. It

is as if Spångberg suggested, that there is no objective, no instrumentality and no technique which comes from outside a specific practice. Practice becomes thus necessary in order to let specific questions emerge, such as what is the relationship between improvisational composition, assemblages of usage and the reproduction as variation? How to interrupt the affirmation of conventions, the feature of spectacularity and prevailing cathartic dramaturgies, without fetishizing once more the "worked form"?

The same is valid for the singing part: Spångberg skips with ease the mimetic and poetic tasks of representational regimes, by singing Ochoa's and Ferrer's lyrics without singing 'alike' them.¹² But he does neither sing 'unlike' them. The specific technique Spångberg proposes does not found in vocal performativity, but in investigating the 'instrumentality' of 'good' singing or 'mimetic' enactment. And by practicing these practices slightly differently, he shifts the focus from representations to the larger field of aesthetics. With this permanent induction of difference through relative variations, Spångberg emphasizes a technique of committed retention, which always remains unfinished. This aspect explains in a way the complex relationship between process and product in this performance: On the one hand, we have of course to do with a product on the performance market, but on the other hand, this product produces only relationships and variations of practices. Within this field of relations, authorship becomes (for the performer as for the audience) the corporeal engineering of assembled usages. Consequently, the deliberate and conscious act of judging, knowing or deciding is opened to a wider sensorial cartography of differences, that refuses any 'objectivity', shows the stochastic failure of the 'model' in representational politics and questions fixed ideas about what the Performing Arts should perform.

It is interesting here to return to the title of the performance *Powered by Emotion*. What is it, who is it, that is powered by emotion? And what in the hell do we still need emotions for?

The performer himself does not display a special emotiveness. His strategy is rather to offer elements, such as a calculated gaze before singing, some balancing movements to the music and a shy smile, which might trigger emotions. Yet in my eyes, it is only the combination with the famous and meanwhile popular airs, that empowers the audience via recognition and memory projection to attribute emotions. Whether or not this kind of 'feeling touched' is really an effect of music or the audience's wish to project what they want to project anyway, is perhaps secondary here. What is rather striking, is that the piece's title characterizes precisely what is commonly reclaimed as goal for and by the cultural industries. Now, Spångberg's deal with that part of the real real is not that of an aesthetical enlightenment politics, since any subject is missing. In the place of a subject or a subject matter only a process occurs: *Powered by emotion*. Substituting the subject, this process has already started but continues in the presence; like a machinery fueled by emotions. But

instead of criticizing the theatrical machinery from the secure distance as which the stage might function, Spångberg rather has it perform. He 'has it perform', for he is not any longer the master of ceremony but one part in the complex interplay of the machinery. The audience is another. And precisely because the process of *powered by emotion* has no subject, which would be able to govern it, precisely because this machinery is relational and dependent on gazes, thoughts, affects and emotions, Spångberg exposes its mechanisms and functions. The audience, maybe incapable to stop the emotion-production, shifts nevertheless the focus to the manner in which this choreography of triggered emotions works. *Powered by Emotion* is thus an experiment whose simple question is: What happens, when I vary given variations within a given frame and a performing technique that keeps the tension inbetween the differential of appropriation and retention? The delighting result is a vivid variation machine which questions via processing, how our emotion-production functions. Until the point, where the apparent invariables of the machine, such as the power supply itself, open up for other variations. As if the emotions, just by being used and exposed, became somehow unplugged, connected to other sensations or occupied with thoughts. What else is this machinery, if it is not a technology?

On paradoxes, love and change

While attending the performance for the first time (at the premiere on August 24, 2003 in Berlin), I wondered, whether Spångberg's dancing could be qualified as style or 'new' technique: the *Spångberg technique* in difference to *Graham*, *Pilates* or *Alexander*. Yet, besides its instrumental character, a technique only becomes recognizable as technique, if it is reproducible and transferable (greetings to the Greeks). This reproducibility of a technique (greetings to the cultural industries) nevertheless contradicts to a notion of technique as that which is appropriate for a specific proceeding. Can there be a singular technique? A 'new' technique?

The paradox of technique becomes evident here: if knowing techniques means transmitting them and making them reproducible, which techniques do we then require in order to invent yet unknown techniques for an always changing real real? Which technique would allow for a change of techniques?

Maybe it was at this moment, somewhere inbetween compositional processes, singular requirements, dance classes and technology, that I thought of love. For, according to Roland Barthes, love is this tension between reproducible figures of discourse and the absolute singularity of the other. And sure, when love becomes a technique which is more general than its addressee, it loses its entire impact, as well as every absolutely unique love reveals as blindspot of a generalized discourse. While considering this very paradox of technique

and the tension between reiteration, singularity and change, I had the impression that the heterogeneous practices of Mårten, Glenn, Keith and Johann converged precisely in this love for a technique of variation. Yet, whereas Bach composed his variations *for tempering the instrument*, the *Spångberg Variations on technology combine a critique of instrumentality with an unlearning of tempered techniques*. The specific skill of Spångberg's performance is *to vary the perception and the dynamics of techniques, in order to adjust them to contemporary concerns*. However, when Spångberg raffines - alike Bach - the interpretation of the 'instrument' which is here a choreographed body in a theatre frame, his variations show up to be - parallelly to the *Goldberg Variations* - not *for* but *of* educational use.

Now, how is it, that both artistic practices became part of a mini-chronology of dilettantes?

The answer seems to be, that the pejorative designation of lovers as dilettantes in opposition to professionals derives from the above paradox of technique: The distinction between "just a lover" and a "professional" assigns knowledge, practice and continuity to the professional. But when the professional knowledge is only reiterating already experienced emotions and known techniques, it shows up to be an obstacle in exercising the profession, for it does not allow to grasp unknown connections, new perceptions and contemporary techniques. The profession thus urgently needs the fragility of love as what connects the dynamics of change to specific alterations. And that is why the "dilettant" character of the *Spångberg Variations on technology* has meanwhile become a historical date, or in delezian terms a physiognomy of change within the profession: Instead of an aesthetical "enlightenment" politics, which illuminates emancipated subjects via conscious messages, the *Spångberg Variations* rather open the place of the former subject for "delighting" processes of variation. These processes pass through emotion, otherwise, how could I declare my delight? Yet, different from being just another refreshing commodity on the market of cultural industries, the "*corporeal exercise of interpreting with diverse variations for body, voice and a black Coca-Cola T-Shirt*" carefully unfolds a complex technology for theatrical machines, experiments with emotions and yet unknown subject matters. And since this technology asks for usage, it can only address to "*dance, performance and other lovers*" in order to be put into another - hopefully dilettante practice...

¹ Yo Tomita: *The "Goldberg" Variations*. (13/5/2005) <<http://www.mu.qub.ac.uk/~tomita/essay/cu4.html>>.

² Steve Paxton: *Goldberg Variations 1-15/ 16-30. Steve Paxton about the video*.
<<http://www.videolepsia.com/STEVE.html>> .

³ I refer here to the critiques of Katja Werner: *Dogmen über Bord! 15. INTERNATIONALES TANZFEST IN BERLIN. Über die feinen Unterschiede zwischen Können und Kunst, zwischen Ausstrahlung und Qualität*, in: Freitag 37, 2003 (05.09.2003), <<http://www.freitag.de/2003/37/03371201.php>> and Stefanie Möller: *Stricken für die Reflexion. Nachlese zum 'westend 04'*, <<http://www.leipzig ->

almanach.de/buehne_alle_jahre_wieder_das_westend_04_praesentiert_zeitgenoessischen_tanz_stefanie_moeller.html>.

⁴ Cf. Brian Massumi (1996): *The Autonomy of Affect*, in : Deleuze : A critical Reader, ed. by Paul Patton, Oxford: Blackwell (Blackwell critical readers), p. 221.

⁵ Massumi, 1996, p. 222.

⁶ Douglas Harper: "*dilettante*", November 2001, in:
<<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=dilettant&searchmode=none>>.

⁷ Yo Tomita, 2005.

⁸ Mike Zwerin describes Jarrett's dilemma as following: "Jarrett realizes that a jazzman playing Bach, on harpsichord to boot, might be considered a dilettante. But he's been playing Bach since the age of 20, and he practices harpsichord for eight years before recording The Goldberg Variations. Is this dilettantism?", in Mike Zwerin: *Sons of Miles. Keith Jarrett: The Well-Tempered Jazz Band*. 25.6.1998 <<http://www.culturekiosque.com/jazz/miles/rhemile13.htm>>. For Steve Paxton and the Buena Vista Social Club, I did not find any sources, that testify directly for dilettantism. However, it took a while until contact dance got appreciated in the realm of dance conventions, as well as the Buena Vista Social Club would probably not have been integrated into the canons of western professional music production, without the film by Ry Cooder.

⁹ I refer here to the debates of *mode 05*, a meeting on dance education, which took place from 13-19 March 2005 at fabrik Potsdam, near to Berlin, where specific demands of a critical choreography embedded in the Performing Arts were shared and discussed in an experimental format. Cf. <<http://mode05.org>>. On a broader level, these discussions draw on the social status of the artist in general and on the different *techniques* to exercise one's independent practice within the conditions of post-industrial Europe. Cf. as well to <<http://involved.minimeta.de>> and to the European manifesto, which was formulated in "meeting one" (13-18 October 2001) in Vienna: <<http://www.meeting-one.info>> . Accentuated is the need for processual strategies such as experimental research including exchange with other disciplines and persons instead of a politics which punctually sells products. It is interesting to confront these discussions with the actual debates in Britain, where a lot of universities offer now the possibility to combine theory and practice within formulas such as a "practice-based" M.A. or PhD. Yet, this opening up to practice from the side of the universities which goes along with an opening of some artistic practice to theory, is as productive as it is problematic: On the one hand, it creates the phenomenon of "Academics go everywhere", whereas independent artists are no longer supported. (And that's where the mentoring scheme of Franko B. becomes extremely important). On the other hand, it runs the risk to become a legitimizing feature for creative institutions instead of generating an exchange about methods, objectives and education in general, which would be fertile for both: arts and science. It would be interesting to follow Rancière's analysis of the regimes of visibility concerning the arts for the history of research, cf. Jacques Rancière (2000): *Le partage du sensible. Esthétique et politique*, Editions de la Fabrique, Paris.

¹⁰ Richard Parry: "*Episteme and Techne*", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/episteme-techne>>.

¹¹ As I tried to show, the notion *technique* already encompasses a practice and a knowledge. The term *technology* thus seems to be a tautology, that even runs the risk of already separating logic and technique in the term itself. Yet, it reveals as advantageous in some aspects, for it connotes the materialized means. If we speak of technological devices, we might first of all think of electric apparatus, optical lenses and chip cybernetics. But as Spångberg shows, it does not make any sense to separate corporeal techniques from electric variation machines. Therefore I use the term technology in particular for the *Spångberg Variations*, since it relates materializations, questions and specific 'instrumentalities' and allows to think variations in a broader sense, for example as variations of compositional and choreographic processes and of dilettante machines.

¹² Cf. Rancière, 2000.